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BOOK REVIEW
PART OF THE SOLUTION RATHER THAN PART OF THE
PROBLEM: A ROLE FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE 1990s
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN*
Marshall-Wythe School of Law Professor Neal Devins has as-
sembled a baker's dozen of essays around the title Public Values,
Private Schools, a new volume in the Stanford Series on Education
and Public Policy.1 The main public value discussed throughout
the book is racial integration, although several authors see the
elimination of discrimination and the enhancement of educational
opportunity for African-Americans as illustrative of even broader
public goals that go to the very core of what it means to be a
democracy.
Although the authors disagree sharply on many issues, a major-
ity of the contributors view the main theme this way: Public ele-
mentary and secondary schools are committed to important public
values that private schools undercut. In other words, private
schools are seen as part of the problem. I argue here that this vi-
sion has things backwards. Rather, in ways preliminarily explored
by Stephen Arons in chapter 4 of Devins' book,2 I show that pri-
vate schools can be part of the solution by describing new litigation
recently brought in Kansas City, Missouri.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.S.B.A., 1964; J.D., 1967,
Northwestern University.
1. PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS (The Stanford Series on Education and Public Pol-
icy, N. Devins ed. 1989).
2. Arons, Educational Choice as a Civil Rights Strategy, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 77.
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I. OVERVIEW
Simply put, many of Devins' authors believe that private schools
threaten our public values both in the specific (racial integration)
and in the general (our democratic consensus). In chapter 9, for
example, Robert Crain and Christine Rossell criticize the earlier
work of James Coleman and others who have extolled the benefits
Catholic schools provide to minority and disadvantaged children,
and argue instead that the Catholic school system is not only itself
significantly segregated, but that it serves also as a white flight ha-
ven for families seeking to escape desegregation in central cities.'
As another example, Henry Levin in chapter 10, while recognizing
certain shortcomings of American public education, belittles Cole-
man's findings on public/parochial school achievement differences4
and argues strongly against the further "privatization" of the
system.'
To be sure, most of the contributors who are worried about what
they see as the negative effects of private schools also recognize
that society faces something of a dilemma over the degree of au-
tonomy it should allow private schools and their users. They ac-
knowledge that other important values are also at stake, especially
the religious values of those who support private education and, in
some of the essays, the broader values of parents who want to
teach their way of life to their children. Nonetheless, the picture of
private schools that many of the contributors paint is one in which
those schools-they have, not Catholic schools, but Protestant fun-
damentalist schools that call themselves "Christian academies,"
primarily in mind-seek to discriminate on grounds of race, sex or
other generally disapproved criteria, or otherwise seek to foster
values that society at large considers intolerant.
Given this clash of values, the critical questions to be addressed
for several of the contributors are of the following sort: How much
and through what means should the state insist that private
schools not discriminate against minority student applicants? How
3. Crain & Rossell, Catholic Schools and Racial Segregation, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 203.
4. Levin, Education as a Public and Private Good, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS,
supra note 1, at 222.
5. Id. at 229.
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much should and may the state insist that private schools actually
achieve racially integrated student bodies? And to what extent
should and may other important basic constitutional values, like
free speech, freedom of association and procedural due process, be
imposed on private schools?
Erwin Chemerinsky considers these matters in chapter 13.' He
argues that the fourteenth amendment's "state action" doctrine
should be refashioned so that "private schools [that] have become
havens for white students fleeing school desegregation ' 7 not only
become fully covered by the anti-race-discrimination principle of
the Constitution, but also become subject to the core constitutional
restrictions generally applicable to other institutions that perform
essential public functions.'
Robert Fullinwider concludes in chapter 2, however, that
"[d]espite the social harm of discriminatory policies and segre-
gated education, church schools do not contribute enough to that
harm to warrant further action against them, in light of the high
value we place on religious freedom."9 In chapter 7, Jeremy Rabkin
seconds this basic outlook and concludes that "[w]e can afford to
be much more tolerant of diversity and deviance than the genera-
tion that fought the Civil War over slavery."'10 Rabkin further
notes that "[iut is at least arguable that neither racial minorities
nor the country at large any longer need to force the remaining
handful of [openly racially exclusionary] places to conform to na-
tional standards of fair treatment.""
Another issue dealt with in the book is the extent to which pri-
vate schools may be forbidden to use discriminatory hiring criteria
for faculty and other employees. This issue is addressed by Wil-
liam Marshall and Joanne Brant in chapter 512 and Carl Esbeck in
6. Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 274.
7. Id. at 275.
8. Id. at 286.
9. Fullinwider, The State's Interest in Racially Nondiscriminatory Education, in PUBLIC
VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 32.
10. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation of Private Education by the In-
ternal Revenue Service, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 151-52.
11. Id. at 152.
12. Marshall & Brant, Employment Discrimination in Religious Schools: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 91.
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chapter 6.13 Marshall and Brant conclude that even religious
schools have no blanket constitutional right to exclude from em-
ployment those applicants they find objectionable on grounds
rooted in church doctrine. 14 Rather, they argue, the courts must
apply a balancing test that protects a school's core religious doctri-
nal interests and basic "sectarian character," but that otherwise
values the state's antidiscrimination interests. 6 Esbeck argues,
however, that, race discrimination aside, the Constitution should
be*read to give "pervasively sectarian schools" wider wagon room
to use employment criteria, such as gender, marital status and sex-
ual preference, that need not be otherwise tolerated in the private
sector.16
Finally, in chapter 12, Tyll van Geel deals with the question of
how much the public should and may police the curriculum of pri-
vate schools in order to root out racist teaching. Van Geel argues
that, despite Professor Ronald Dworkin's earlier and general asser-
tions to the contrary, this question has no philosophically determi-
nate answer and, as a result, unresolved legal conflict is likely to
persist in this area.17
As to what we should make of these conflicting public values,
Devins concludes in his introductory chapter that "Christian edu-
cators ultimately prevail on programmatic matters; the state ulti-
mately prevails on nondiscrimination matters."' 8
As I read these essays, I sensed that several of the chapters
adopted an outlook toward private schools that seems to me more
fitting of the headier days of the early 1970s. At that time, the
Supreme Court's firmer resolve and, probably more importantly,
the federal executive agencies' growing enforcement of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, gave real hope that not only would the back of
official discrimination in schools be broken, but that, as a result,
13. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Limit on Governmental Regulation of Reli-
gious Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 114.
14. Marshall & Brant, supra note 12, at 108.
15. Id.
16. Esbeck, supra note 13, at 126.
17. Van Geel, State Control of the Private School's Curriculum: An Essay in Law, Juris-
prudence and Political Philosophy, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at
267.
18. Devins, Introduction: Private Schools and Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 5.
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our nation's children would actually attend integrated schools. In
this Book Review, I argue that those concerned about race and pri-
vate education need a different outlook in the 1990s.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LEGAL BATTLE AGAINST
SEGREGATION IN SCHOOLS
A. Through 1973
Think back to 1973. In the few years previous to 1973, the Su-
preme Court firmly rejected two tactics that many de jure segre-
gated public school districts in the South had hoped to use in or-
der to avoid the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.9 In
1968, in Green v. County School Board,20 the Court struck down a
scheme that assigned children to their formerly all white or all
black schools and gave them the "choice" to enroll in what was
plainly still the other race's school." Even more important, in 1971
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,22 the
Court said that a segregated school district could not simply adopt
a neighborhood school assignment plan when that would leave the
district with schools that were largely identifiable as black or white
schools. 23 Furthermore, in 1973 in Keyes v. School District No. 1,24
the Court appeared to be spreading its desegregation vision out of
the South and to the North and West as well.
Early on, civil rights advocates understandably feared that
whites in the South would seek to evade Brown by establishing
private "white only" school systems. In one version, white political
power would close the public schools, and individual families
would be left to fund their children's schooling on their own, with
whites banding together to form their own schools, and African-
Americans left even worse off than they were under a regime of
"separate but [un]equal" public schools. In 1964, the Supreme
Court cut off that strategy in Griffin v. County School Board.25
19. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
20. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
21. Id. at 441.
22. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
23. Id. at 21.
24. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
25. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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A second fear was that public schools would continue, but whites
would largely abandon them for racially exclusive private schools
that would be promoted through public funding. The Supreme
Court, however, waylaid this gambit in- 1964 in Griffin and in 1968
in Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission.26 In
1973, the Court finally put the issue to rest in Norwood v.
Harrison.17
But what if whites merely went their own way, forming "white
academies" and paying for them with their own money? Civil
rights groups employed two main legal strategies to attack this de-
velopment. First, they sought to bar federal tax benefits to private
schools that discriminated on the basis of race. This successful ef-
fort, which received its main boost through a 1970 federal district
court decision in Green v. Kennedy,8 is discussed at several points
in Devins' book, especially in Jeremy Rabkin's thoughtful chap-
ter.29 Today, a private school must advertise clearly that it does
not discriminate on the basis of race in order to qualify as a feder-
ally tax exempt organization.
A step down that same line failed, however. As Rabkin explains,
in the late 1970s civil rights groups convinced the Carter Adminis-
tration that the Internal Revenue Service should deny tax exempt
status to a private school unless it could show that it either actu-
ally attained certain racially balanced targets or had tried very
hard but failed to attract an integrated student body.30 This ap-
proach generated tremendous opposition, however, and was never
implemented. 3'
Yet even if the Carter Administration had stuck to its guns,
whether the IRS's aggressive approach would have had an impor-
tant impact in integrating private schools is by no means clear. Put
most simply, many private schools that were not integrated could
26. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
27. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
28. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
29. Rabkin, supra note 10, at 140-47.
30. Id. at 143-44.
31. Id. at 144-45. According to Rabkin, Rev. Jerry Falwell's "Moral Majority" got off the
ground by leading a letter-writing campaign against the proposed IRS regulations. Id. at
144. When the Reagan Administration withdrew its support for Green, as Rabkin reminds
us, this too ran into a storm of opposition from Congress and the public.
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have merely forfeited their tax exempt status. The main advantage
of that status is that donors can take income tax deductions for
their donations to the school, thereby having Uncle Sam shoulder
part of the cost of their contributions. While this is clearly an ad-
vantage that most private schools seek to exploit, there is little rea-
son to think that it is absolutely critical for the new private schools
that sprang up in response to Brown.
The second prong of the attack on white academies seeking to
run around Brown was to try to block their very right to exclude
on the basis of race. This approach was also generally successful.
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary32 concluded
that an 1866 civil rights statute should be read to preclude private
schools from refusing to enter into contracts with parents of appli-
cants on the basis of their race. 3
Even though individual African-American families now have the
legal right to force their way into schools that do not want them,
and can pin substantial financial penalties on schools that refuse
them for racial reasons, the fact remains that the mere existence of
this legal right cannot result in substantially integrated private
schools unless significant numbers of minority families actually ap-
ply. So, even if some white academies are exposed and embar-
rassed, actual integration in the private sector depends on volun-
tary behavior by private schools and minority families.
Furthermore, although many private schools probably still discrim-
inate secretly, or would if presented with the opportunity, notwith-
standing formal representations they make, surely most schools in
the private sector today do not exclude African-Americans
intentionally.
This state of legal and social affairs reveals why, at least as of
1973, one might see private schools as a critical part of the prob-
lem of educational discrimination. So long as African-Americans
do not knock on the doors of largely Wvhite private schools in sub-
32. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (adopting the position taken by the federal district court that first
decided the question in Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D.
Va. 1973), a companion case before the Court with Runyon).
33. 427 U.S. at 172. The Court reserved the question of whether religious schools have a
constitutional defense to the statute based on the free exercise clause. See generally Lay-
cock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 Tax. L. REV. 259
(1982).
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stantial numbers, significant racial integration in private schools
will not occur. And to the extent that whites flee or have fled pub-
lic schools for private schools, these factors together threaten to
mar badly what in the early 1970s was taken by many in the civil
rights community to be the real vision of Brown: well integrated
education for all Americans.
B. Since 1973
It is no longer 1973. Whatever the breadth of that vision then, it
appears well beyond our grasp today for reasons that, in my judg-
ment, have little to do with private schools. Indeed, in 1974 the
Supreme Court itself dealt that vision a blow from which it shows
no signs of recovery.
Whatever the perception of racial demographics might have
been in 1954 when Brown was decided, it was clear by 1974 when
the Court decided Milliken v. Bradley34 that, in many large metro-
politan areas, whites with young children were living increasingly
in the suburbs and the city's schools were becoming increasingly
black. Indeed, in Detroit, the scene of Milliken, the public schools
were so overwhelmingly black that to spread the few remaining
whites around, in the view of the federal district court, would have
given African-American children at best only a token proportion of
white classmates. Besides, that strategy might well have driven
many of those few whites from the Detroit schools altogether.
For the advocates of school integration, the solution clearly lay
in metropolitan integration. But the Burger Court balked, with the
Chief Justice providing the one-vote majority and writing the
Court's opinion. Given that the plaintiffs had not proved that the
suburbs engaged in official segregation, the Court concluded that it
could not force the suburbs to participate in a metropolitan racial
balance plan that would send some suburban pupils into the De-
troit schools and would bring minority schoolchildren from Detroit
into the suburban schools.3 5
The negative consequences of Milliken to the racial balance vi-
sion of Brown cannot be exaggerated. The dream was dashed,
period.
34. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
35. Id. at 745.
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In a few places during the subsequent sixteen years, some law-
yers have tried to show that the suburbs were party to the school
segregation under attack, but they have been basically unsuccess-
ful. In other communities, efforts to achieve racial balance within
individual school districts have continued. The realization that
largely white suburbs would remain exempt from the solution,
however, necessarily and dramatically changed the terms of the de-
segregation effort.
Simultaneously, we began to see a declining enthusiasm in the
African-American community for integration per se and for the
busing needed to achieve it. For one thing, busing all too often
seemed to mean one-way busing: from the black to the white com-
munity. Moreover, even if the burden of attending school out of
one's neighborhood was shared fairly by all races, what coerced ra-
cial balance would actually achieve became less clear. To be re-
ceived with hostility in the name of "body-count" integration
surely must have begun to seem less appealing to many who had
assumed that racial balance, at a minimum, would promote racial
tolerance. For another thing, even the most optimistic of the social
science evidence that began pouring in cast grave doubts on the
idea that racial balance alone might somehow eliminate black-
white school achievement differences.
In short, with the battle against official racism won, attention
turned to the far less tractable problem that is increasingly called
"institutional racism." In that climate, many African-Americans
began to suggest that if they only had a decent amount of money
and could run the schools in their own neighborhoods, they would
find that more satisfactory than what integration promised realisti-
cally. Therefore, although a few celebrated school districts were in
the national news during the 1980s as a result of their school inte-
gration controversies, to argue that we have made significant over-
all progress toward racial balance in the public schools during the
past decade would be very difficult. Moreover, we now show little
appetite as a nation for further movement in that direction.
In 1990, we are in an altogether different situation than in 1973.
White flight to white academies, looming then as a key barrier to
racial balance, is just no longer the scale of problem that it seemed
1990] 689
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
then. 6 Indeed, during the last few decades private schools have
never accounted for as many as one in five children nationally, and
so far there is little reason to imagine that they will in the future.
To the contrary, although fundamentalist Christian schools in
many locales have experienced enormous growth over the past
twenty-five years, the sharp downward trend in enrollment in
Catholic schools has left the private sector throughout much of the
nation with a declining share of the market.
This does not mean that formal racial discrimination in private
schools should be ignored. But as Devins points out, we can hardly
hold private schools "more accountable for attaining the goals of
compulsory education than . . . public schools. 31 And because, as
we have seen, suburban public schools in general are not being re-
quired to be racially balanced in ways that reflect metropolitan
demographics, the end of the legal line today for both those public
and private schools is the need for cooperation rather than coer-
cion. Or, as Rabkin put it, "[I]f the Court was unwilling or unable
to pursue the ultimate logic of integration in public education, it
should not be surprising, after all, that private schools continued
to be treated very cautiously."3 "
In this light, it seems much more valuable to think about how we
can encourage private schools to be part of the solution rather than
working on ways to bludgeon them on the theory that they are an
important part of the problem. Put differently, what we need at
this juncture is the creative use of carrots instead of sticks.3 9
Three of Devins' authors see the role of private schools broadly
in this way. I will mention briefly here the interesting perspectives
two essays offer. In chapter 3, Michael Rebell analyzes
the dilemma of how to reconcile the schools' responsibility for
inculcating the "fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
36. As Rabkin notes, "In northern cities . . .more white parents deserted the public
schools for the suburbs than for private schools." Rabkin, supra note 10, at 148.
37. Devins, supra note 18, at 14.
38. Rabkin, supra note 10, at 149.
39. For some suggestions my colleague John Coons and I have made previously along
these lines, see Sugarman & Coons, Choice and Integration: A Model Statute, in PARENTS,
TEACHERS AND CHILDREN: PROSPECTS FOR CHOICE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 279 app. A (1977),
and Abrams, Coons & Sugarman, School Integration Through Carrots, Not Sticks, 17 THE-
ORY INTO PRAC. 23 (1978).
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nance of a democratic political system" with the critical need in
a liberal democratic society not to have the state impose values
that "may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his
or her family."4
Focusing on dissenting public school parents, who lately have sued
to ban certain books from the schools and to remove their children
from certain courses in the curriculum, Rebell concludes that the
best solution lies in providing private school vouchers for "religious
values dissenters."'41 Paying for the education of those children at
private schools is not only meant to create "an effective escape
valve that will release this dissenting pressure to an outside envi-
ronment"42 that is attractive to those parents, but also to permit
the public schools to take on a revitalized value-inculcating role
that Rebell favors.43
John Chubb and Terry Moe argue in chapter 8 that private
schools are more effective than public schools not simply because
they generally require more homework and impose more discipline,
which they do, but more importantly because they "have more
control over their own destinies. 4 4 This independence from "di-
rect democratic control" yields schools that "are more oriented to-
ward academic excellence, personal growth and fulfillment, and
human relations skills, ' 45 and teachers who "have better relation-
ships with their principals" and who "are much more satisfied with
their jobs. '46 Chubb and Moe conclude that "improvements cannot
simply be imposed on schools in the public sector"; 47 new organiza-
tional arrangements are necessary. 4s To that end, they tentatively
endorse educational voucher proposals, suggesting that providing
vouchers of greater value for difficult-to-educate students might be
40. Rebell, Values Inculcation and the Schools: The Need for a New Pierce Compromise,
in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 37 (footnotes omitted).
41. Id. at 52.
42. Id. at 49.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Chubb & Moe, Effective Schools and Equal Opportunity, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 167.
45. Id. at 170.
46. Id. at 171.
47. Id. at 178.
48. Id. at 179.
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wise. 49 They would insist that participating schools could not dis-
criminate on the basis of race, but, like Rebell, they do not focus
their attention or their proposal on the specific goal of racial
integration."
This brings me to Stephen Arons' chapter and the Kansas City
story. Arons argues that we should think of using private schools
as an important part of the civil rights strategy, specifically advo-
cating that education vouchers be offered to victims of segrega-
tion." Arons has long been intrigued by the use of family choice
mechanisms in support of liberal causes.52 His main focus previ-
ously has been on those who have objected to public schooling on
religious and other value grounds.5 3 Here he turns specifically to
racial minorities, arguing that a carefully regulated voucher plan
targeted at African-American families in districts found to have
engaged in school segregation holds considerable promise, espe-
cially when the African-American children in question have few
other prospects of integrated education.
5 4
In such settings, Arons proposes: "The vouchers would be usable
in complete payment for attendance at any suburban public
school, or at any district or suburban private school willing to ac-
cept plaintiff children and provide them with an education satisfy-
ing minimum standards set by the court and the state's applicable
statutes."55 Arons specifically mentions Detroit and Kansas City as
desirable places in which to try this solution.56
As Arons recognizes, he is lending his support to a proposal that
my colleague John Coons and I advanced in an amicus brief we
prepared in 1977 when a California Superior Court judge appeared
49. Id. Compare the text to the views in chapter 11 of John and Shirley Lachs, who argue
that those who favor voucher plans "tend to take a romantic view of private schools." Lachs
& Lachs, Education and the Power of the State: Reconceiving Some Problems and Their
Solutions, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 247. The Lachs conclude
that the basic problem for most schools today, public and private, is the lack of "immedi-
acy," although they do not offer any policies that might be adopted in order to achieve it.
Id.
50. Chubb & Moe, supra note 44, at 179.
51. Arons, supra note 2, at 63-64.
52. See, e.g., Arons, Equity, Option, and Vouchers, 72 TCHRS. C. REC. 337 (1971).
53. See, e.g., S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING (1983).
54. Arons, supra note 2, at 77.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 76.
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to be taking on the job of providing a desegregation remedy to Af-
rican-American children in the Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
tricts."7 Nothing came of that effort, but, as I will detail in the next
section, perhaps now something will come of this idea in Kansas
City.
III. THE KANSAS CITY STORY
A. Background
The Kansas City, Missouri school district was found guilty of
racial segregation in 1984." At that time, the district's schools, en-
rolling more than 35,000 pupils, were more than two-thirds Afri-
can-American. Plaintiffs in the suit sought a compulsory metropol-
itan racial integration remedy,59 but they failed before both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.6 0
Moreover, as in Detroit some years previously, the trial court con-
cluded that it would be unwise to adopt a racial balance scheme
for the Kansas City school district that would simply spread
around the white students who made up a little more than one-
fourth of the district's total population.6 '
Instead, federal district Judge Clark embraced two other impor-
tant strategies designed to achieve high quality integrated schools
for the African-American plaintiff children. First, a series of first
class magnet schools would be created in Kansas City that would
57. See Amicus Brief Supporting Court-Ordered Voluntary Integration Plan in Craw-
ford v. Los Angeles Unified School District, reprinted in PARENTS, TEACHERS AND CHILDREN:
PROSPECTS FOR CHOICE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 301 app. B (1977). For an earlier discussion
of mine about racial integration under a system of educational vouchers and suggestions as
to how integration might be promoted through choice, see Sugarman, Family Choice: The
Next Step in the Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity?, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
513, 544 (1974).
In chapter 9, Crain and Rossell also recognize that, along with what they see to be the
negative effects of parochial schools on integration, those schools currently provide some
benefits, such as maintaining integrated central city neighborhoods and providing desegre-
gated education for some African-American students. Crain & Rossell, supra note 3, at 208.
Moreover, they imagine "a private school subsidy plan that would enable more low-income
minority students to gain a desegregated education." Id. at 209.
58. Jenkins v. State, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
59. Id. at 1489.
60. Jenkins v. State, 807 F.2d 657, 682 (8th Cir. 1986).
61. Jenkins v. State, 639 F. Supp. 19, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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be required to have racially balanced student bodies.2 In addition
to white children who might be attracted to these schools from ex-
isting Kansas City schools, the court hoped that the schools would
attract white children from surrounding suburban school districts
and private schools.6 3
Second, Judge Clark arranged for the creation of a voluntary
transfer plan by which African-American students from the Kan-
sas City school district would have their way paid to public schools
of their choice in the surrounding school districts. 4 The financial
burden of the interdistrict transfer plan was designed to fall
largely on the state, also a defendant in the original case, so that
the Kansas City school district would not suffer economically from
the loss of its pupils, and the receiving school districts would not
find it burdensome to accept new students. 5
Plainly, if a substantial number of whites could be attracted into
Kansas City magnet schools and if a substantial number of Afri-
can-Americans elected to transfer to the white suburbs, then the
chance that African-American children living in the Kansas City
school district could obtain an integrated education would be im-
proved greatly.
Unfortunately, this two-pronged strategy has failed thus far.
First, although a large number of African-American parents in
Kansas City indicated to the district's Desegregation Monitoring
Committee that they would like to send their children to schools in
surrounding public school districts, those districts have been un-
willing to accept any Kansas City pupils. Just why those school
districts have been unwilling to cooperate is a mystery. Under the
court's plan, the districts would receive reasonable "tuition" pay-
ments on behalf of the children they accept,66 and many of them
surely must have room for at least a few additional pupils. Under
the plan, the districts can refuse children with a history of serious
discipline problems, although they otherwise must accept those
62. Id. at 55.
63. Id. at 54.
64. Id. at 38-39.
65. Id. at 39.
66. Id.
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students wanting to attend, up to the number of places the dis-
tricts make available.6
Perhaps some of the boards of education in the neighboring dis-
tricts just do not want an infusion of African-American pupils, al-
though, of course, they are not saying that. Some boards may
worry about what sort of students they would get, race aside. Yet,
because these students would be from families eager for them to
attend, the pupils would seemingly be rather attractive to the dis-
trict; besides, public schools claim to be well accustomed to taking
those students they get. Perhaps the surrounding districts, genu-
inely feared that by cooperating with this part of the remedy, they
would be setting themselves up for subsequent coerced participa-
tion in arrangements that they and the families residing within
their boundaries opposed. Whether such fears are realistic is an-
other question. In any event, the outcome has been that this por-
tion of the remedy simply has not functioned.
The magnet school strategy also has not worked very well. Al-
though some schools with facilities that are said to be state-of-the-
art have opened, on the whole these magnet schools have not at-
tracted as many white pupils as had been desired. As a result, the
Kansas City school district has been deliberately running many of
these schools well below full capacity in order to keep them within
the target racial balance norms, hoping that success in these
schools will draw in more whites over time. The result in the
meantime is that African-American children have significantly
fewer integration opportunities than had been anticipated. Indeed,
the under-utilization of the magnet schools has created considera-
ble controversy within the African-American community, and the
school district has been sued by some African-American families
who, given the current situation, would rather have the magnet
schools filled up with African-American pupils on waiting lists.
Finally, it is worth noting that as of the fall of 1989, the overall
proportion of minorities in the Kansas City school district has in-
creased somewhat in the past five years and is now just under sev-
enty-five percent.68
67. Id.
68. Mansur, Integration slowing, school figures indicate, Kansas City Star, Sept. 21,
1989, at 1A, col. 4.
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B. The Rivarde Suit
On July 14, 1989, African-American parents filed a complaint in
federal district court in Kansas City, on behalf of their children
and other similarly situated public school children, seeking to force
the defendants, the School District of Kansas City and the State of
Missouri, to pay for the claimants' private schooling."
The plaintiffs in Rivarde v. State7 0 include some named children
who sought to attend Kansas City magnet schools but were denied
entrance because the schools had reached their limit of African-
American children, other named children who have had to attend
school far from home in order to be enrolled in a not mostly Afri-
can-American school, and other named children who were simply
stuck in mostly or completely African-American neighborhood
schools with no other apparent opportunities being made available
to them by the school district. 1
In preparation for their lawsuit, the plaintiffs and their lawyers
contacted and secured promises of cooperation from about fifty
private schools in the area; most of these schools are run by reli-
gious groups, predominantly Catholic.7 2 These schools have repre-
sented to the plaintiffs' counsel that they would be willing to take
African-American children on the same terms as the federal court's
voluntary interdistrict transfer plan imagines for the surrounding
public schools."3 That is, they could refuse certain children with a
history of disciplinary problems, but otherwise they would take all
applicants up to the number of spaces they made available. The
schools would not discriminate on the basis of religion or ability,
69. Rivarde v. State, No. 89-0671 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 1989). For news accounts relating to
this lawsuit, see Anderson, Curing Segregation, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 22; King, When
Desegregation Backfires: Black parents sue the State to pay for private schools, NEwS-
WEEK, July 31, 1989, at 56; Snider, Voucher Plan for Disadvantaged Pursued in Kansas
City Lawsuit, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 2, 1989, at 1; Carter, Professors' Theory Implemented in
Missouri Desegregation Case, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7, 1989, at 4; Suit Says Magnet Schools Bar
Black Children, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at A14, col. 5; O'Connor, Black Pupils want
tuition vouchers, Kansas City Times, July 15, 1989, at Al, col. 5; Mansur, Black students
seek to attend private schools, Kansas City Star, July 14, 1989, at 3A, col. 1.
70. No. 89-0671 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 1989).
71. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 10-11.
72. Id. at 11-18.
73. Id. for discussion of and citation to those terms; see supra notes 66-67 and accompa-
nying text.
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although applying families would be informed of each school's reli-
gious affiliation and academic standards.
The Rivarde plaintiffs have asked that the defendants pay the
tuition of African-American Kansas City pupils electing to attend
these cooperating private schools. 4 Because the tuition cost of
Catholic and most other religious schools is quite low compared
with the cost of the suburban public schools, the financial burden
on the defendants of supporting this remedy would be considera-
bly less than it would be if the suburbs opened their public schools
to these same pupils.
According to the plaintiffs' lawyers, the approximately fifty pri-
vate schools that had agreed to participate even before the com-
plaint was filed are collectively willing to make about 4,000 places
available.75 Moreover, the named plaintiffs allege that they have
found specific private schools that they wish to attend and that
have agreed to accept them. 6
Most of the schools that have agreed to cooperate currently have
few African-American children enrolled: in a large number of cases
fewer than five percent, and in several cases between five and
twenty percent.77 Some of these schools actually have a majority of
African-American*pupils, and in at least one case the school is al-
ready more than ninety percent African-American. 8
What does this data tell us about Kansas City private schools?
We see that many of the private schools in metropolitan Kansas
City are very white, broadly reflecting the findings about Cleve-
land, Boston and Chicago Catholic schools reported by Crain and
Rossell in their chapter in Devins' book.79 Those with less than five
percent African-American pupils would be classified by many as
racially isolated, although for the few African-American families
sending their children to those schools, this may well qualify as an
integrated experience. In any- event, even if we include all of the
74. Id. at 19-20.
75. Id. at 11-17.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id. at 11-16.
78. Id. at 17. Just how a judge otherwise supportive of the claim would feel about includ-
ing African-American majority schools as a permissible option, especially racially isolated
African-American schools, remains to be seen.
79. Crain & Rossell, supra note 3, at 185.
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private schools that have up to fifteen percent African-American
pupils, we see that opportunities to attend school with large num-
bers of white children are being provided to few African-American
children.
At the same time, the overall picture, including the African-
American majority and African-American isolated private schools,
hardly demonstrates that the Kansas City private school sector in-
tentionally discriminates on the basis of race. Like the predomi-
nantly white suburban public schools, the main point is surely that
most of these private schools simply do not have many African-
American applicants. At the other extreme, the explanation for the
mostly African-American private elementary schools is also re-
vealing. These, in general, are schools in inner city neighborhoods
that white Catholic families largely have abandoned as younger
whites have moved away. Rather than closing these schools, Catho-
lic leaders have kept them open to provide an educational alterna-
tive to neighborhood children whose parents do not want them to
attend public schools. Often, these African-American parents are
not Catholic. To criticize these Catholic schools for promoting dis-
crimination when they are providing a preferred, albeit largely Af-
rican-American, school experience seems odd to ne.
Of course, the Catholic schools might engage in a racial balance
effort among themselves, for example, by assigning their elemen-
tary school children to schools outside their parish, the geographic
base upon which Catholic elementary schools are organized. But
this, of course, would be contrary to the traditional decentralized
Catholic school "system." In any event, the Rivarde plaintiffs as-
sert that the Catholic schools in the area are now generally willing
to accept African-American voucher-carrying pupils from Kansas
City until they fill up their buildings. And if that were to happen,
most of these Catholic schools would be very well integrated.
C. Prospects
The Rivarde case presents a stunning challenge to the federal
judiciary. The claimants, having filed a separate lawsuit seeking
further relief not inconsistent with the earlier Kansas City desegre-
gation suit, initially drew federal Judge Stevens. On motion of the
defendants, however, Judge Stevens exercised his discretion and on
October 13, 1989, transferred the matter to Judge Clark who is
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continuing to supervise the Kansas City desegregation effort he
previously ordered. On November 28, 1989, Judge Clark dismissed
the Rivarde complaint on the ground that plaintiffs stated no sepa-
rate cause of action, but rather sought to modify the remedial plan
of the original Kansas City litigation. 0 He then stated that the
proper avenue for the plaintiffs was to seek intervention in the
original litigation, but went on to indicate, seemingly in dictum,
that he was disinclined to grant either intervention as of right or
permissive intervention." If Judge Clark finally so rules, the plain-
tiffs will almost surely seek review in the Eighth Circuit on both
the independent cause of action and intervention as of right
theories.
Although the matter is currently tied up in procedural wran-
gling, the attractiveness of the plaintiffs' case should at once be
evident. The initial desegregation remedies have stalled or failed;
but now an immediate opportunity is present for many children to
obtain what they consider to be an integrated education at a school
that is willing to take them. Not only that, but this solution would
simultaneously help improve the racial balance in the receiving
private schools and diminish the number of African-American
pupils for whom the Kansas City school district would have to try
to find an integrated education. To boot, the cost to government
should decline, perhaps significantly, as compared with the cost of
the voluntary interdistrict plan. Furthermore, the adoption of this
remedy possibly would be the critical factor needed to win over the
cooperation of the white suburban public schools. Although these
suburban public schools possibly could use the availability of the
private school choice as an excuse not to participate in the volun-
tary integration plan, over the long haul the suburban public
schools surely ought to be embarrassed to witness private schools
in their midst volunteering to take on the social responsibility of
desegregation that the public schools have rejected for some years
now.
80. Order at 2, Rivarde (No. 89-067).
81. Id. at 5-7; see Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify Court's Nov. 28,
1989 Order at I (in which defendant concedes that the question of intervention in the order
is dicta).
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Notwithstanding all of the obvious advantages, the state and
school district defendants, as well as counsel for the plaintiff
schoolchildren in the original Kansas City integration case, have
opposed the private school choice plan. Some of the objections
have been couched in constitutional terms: that this would be an
impermissible aid to religion under the first amendment. Although
this is not a frivolous argument, I find it unpersuasive in view of
recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue."2
Quite apart from this legal question, apparently the state offi-
cials are simply uncomfortable with the idea that private schools
can have a positive role to play in solving difficult desegregation
problems. Probably they fear that this would be the first step to-
ward a full blown system of family choice in education that they
perceive as endangering public schools; 8 but that, of course, is not
a necessary outcome, whether desirable or not, and to sacrifice the
interests of African-American children today in the name of that
possibility seems rather harsh. Maybe those opposing this new liti-
gation anticipate that, when push comes to shove, few African-
American families will actually choose to participate in the plan
proposed in Rivarde. But then, not a great deal is risked, even if
little might be gained.
In the end, I believe that what gets in the way of public officials'
good will is that they, like many of Devins' authors, are so accus-
tomed to seeing private schools as part of the problem of racial
isolation that they have not yet realized that those schools might
become an important part of the solution.
82. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (On
remand, the Washington Supreme Court en banc, struck down the aid in question under the
state constitution. 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d. 1119, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 147 (1989));
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
83. In my view, the right sort of family choice plan will not only serve children and fami-
lies better, but also actually improve public education. See generally J. CooNs & S.
SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978).
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